Compliance and Enforcement in the Norwegian fishing sector.

The cheating problem is an interesting topic. From a management perspective the cost of control of the fishery is high, it is thus desirable to tailor regulative tools better. From an academic perspective - the compliance and enforcement problem provides the opportunity to compare the impact of instruments that are designed to change the cheating behaviour. The basic thesis in the economic model is that the actors consider violations of the regulations if an economic gain would be obtained by it. The rep resentative (co-management) model assumes that the individual decision is based on just and moral rather than pure self-interest. The actors are here represented in the systems that design the regulations and they are instrumental in the enforcement of th eregulations. Such systems have a high score on legitimacy. Not all co-management systems are conducive to legitimacy. It is important to find arrangements where "rules by officials are backed up by social enforcement of users". The purpose here is to ap ply factor form both models and see how they apply to compliance in the Norwegian fisheries. The analysis address to wh at extent factors of economic reasoning or reasoning based on legitimacy have any impact on the compliance behaviour of the actors in t he fishing industry.