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FRIHUMSAM-Fri prosj.st. hum og sam

Effective Non-Violence? Resistance Strategies and Political Outcomes

Awarded: NOK 10.0 mill.

This project examines the origins and consequences of non-violent direct action, and collects new data on claims and tactics in conflict processes. We here summarize key achievements during the reporting period. Dahl et al. (2016) provides a simple general formal model of when non-state actors will choose violent and non-violent strategies in dissent. The effectiveness of dissident tactics is taken as determined by individual participation. However, the non-violent campaigns have few barriers to individual participation, since it requires few skills, while participation in violent campaigns tends to be capped, at least in the short run. Thus, even if one assumes that non-violent direct is never absolutely more effective than violence at any fixed level of participation, non-violent direct action can still be relatively more effective than violence a large group that can mobilize more and generate significant governance costs with non-violent direct action. By contrast, violence can be more attractive for small and marginalized groups, unable to mobilize large numbers under non-violent direct action. Group audience can in turn be related to motives, the inclusiveness of claims, as well as resources for mobilization. Dahl et al. (2016) helps account for a number of empirical findings regarding the choice of tactics. Similar issues such as lack of democracy and political exclusion can motivate both violent and non-violent direct action, but different types of actors are likely to use non-violent or violent tactics. Non-violent direct action is more likely for broad based/universal claims for regime change or democratization, and movements in urban settings and more resource rich social environments, while violence is more likely for peripheral groups seeking self-determination. Dahl et al. (2016) present empirical evidence on differences between violent and non-violent campaigns consistent with the model predictions, and the predictions helps to account for outbreaks of non-violent campaigns, based on indicators of likely motivation and differences in resources. The model is also supported by the existing results published by Cunningham (2013) on tactic choice by self-determination groups. The data distinguish between conventional politics, mass non-violent campaigns, and civil war. Over 80% of the self-determination group state dyads make active claims, but these remain largely confined to conventional politics rather than direct action, especially in democracies that permit groups to pursue their demands by regular political participation. Violent direct action is absolutely more common than large scale non-violent direct action. It is relatively easy to identify self-determination groups in advance and then consider the choice of tactics. However, this is also a highly restricted focus, since many non-violent campaigns involve universal claims and are not sectarian. Chenoweth and Ulfelder (2015) suggest that social structure alone has low power to predict non-violent uprisings, and suggest that actor characteristics are very important. Identifying potential actors that can make claims on the government in advance is hard, but our data on governmental claims allow us to identify explicit claims first and then study whether these escalate to violence or non-violent direct action. White et al. (2016) provide a proof of concept for all former states in the Soviet Union, and Cunningham et al (2016) analyze a random sample of 101 countries, indicating that non-violent claims on the government will turn violent in more ethnically polarized societies (suggesting that Syria may have wider applicability, even if in less extreme scale), as well as evidence that urbanization and a more developed societies make non-violent mass mobilization more likely in autocracies. Gleditsch and Rivera (2016) extend previous work non-violent direct action on transitions to democracy (Rivera and Gleditsch 2013) and the diffusion of democracy (Gleditsch and Ward 2006) to diffusion of non-violent direct action. Non-violent direct action is effective in undermining autocracies and tend to diffuse, suggesting that protest and non-violent contention are important component of global trends in democratization. Chenoweth and Shock (2015) demonstrate that radical flanks do not in general enhance the effectiveness of non-violent campaigns. Cunningham, Dahl, and Frugé (2016) show that tactical innovation can help enhance the effectiveness of territorial or ethnic campaigns. The project was concluded with a policy workshop at PRIO in August 2016, open to the public. This included a plenary address by Srdja Popovic of the Center for Applied Non-Violent Sanctions, presentations of seven policy briefs from the project, as well as a roundtable discussion of the policy implications of research of non-violence and violence.

This project will develop a theoretical framework for examining dissident organizations and how strategic context influences decisions about protest strategies. We will examine decisions whether to use violence or non-violent action, in relation to (1) th e population organizations represent, (2) other organizations representing the same constituency, (3) responses by the state, and (4) the actions of external actors. The framework leads to a series of hypotheses about the determinants of group strategic c hoice, which we will examine through a combination of large-n statistical analyses and detailed case studies of the Former Yugoslavia and North Africa. The quantitative analysis will be based on new data identifying organizations in conflict with the stat e over control of the government or autonomy and their specific strategies on an annual basis. The case studies will involve detailed comparison of organizations using violence and non-violent tactics in an effort to identify the determinants of this beha vior. We will also examine whether non-violent methods are more likely to be used by different groups or actors than violent organizations, including the role of resources and female participation. This project will contribute to our theoretical and empir ical understanding of resort to violence and the use of non-violent action, and enhance our understanding of how actions by states and external actors can affect the likelihood of violence and alternative strategies. The project will inform both academic research on strategic choice and protest as well as possible responses by policymakers. Whereas a large literature examines how the international community can facilitate the termination of violent conflicts through methods such as mediation or peacekeepi ng, there has been little attention to how international actors may facilitate conflict prevention or transformation through promoting non-violent action.

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FRIHUMSAM-Fri prosj.st. hum og sam