Asian countries's interest in the High North: Security/foreign policy, energy, shipping and research/climate change

The project identified seven categories of interest in the Arctic among the major Asian countries: i) overarching political / geopolitical ambitions of being present and wield influence in an emerging global geopolitical hot spot, ii) the need to understand the fundamental climate change dynamics in the Arctic which are likely to impact on Asian weather/climate patterns, iii) the availability of energy and mineral resources in Arctic regions, iv) the potential for exploiting the Northern Sea Route for trade, shipping and ship-building, v) the likely emergence of the Arctic as an attractive tourist destination, vi) access to the region's fisheries resources, and finally vii) their interest in buying into research, development and communication efforts. China, Japan and Korea have interests along all these dimensions, India primarily along the two first and the last one. Overall Korea and China are displaying most interest in the Arctic, a position previously and historically held by Japan. Access to Arctic energy has become less of an issue compared to only 5-6 years ago. Developments in the international energy markets and changes in energy policy and the energy sector of major Asian states have reduced their interest and ability to engage in large, long-term offshore energy projects. The Asian energy engagements taking place in the Arctic are best explained by the eagerness of resource owners, notably Russia, to involve Asian companies and capital, than by a strong desire of Asian states to invest there. The interest in Arctic hard minerals have turned out to be weaker than anticipated, very much because the resource base is poorer or less accessible than previously thought. The Chinese engagement in Greenland?s minerals has been misconstrued. The enthusiasm about Arctic shipping has waned somewhat compared to the picture a few years back because of growing understanding of the complexities of arctic navigation, undecidedness in Russian policy and also developments in the shipping market. Asian shipping activity in the Arctic will grow, but not at the rate expected earlier. This is still important in a Norwegian or regional perspective. The interest in understanding Arctic climate change dynamics and their connection to the climate in Asian has proved more important than expected in all countries, including in terms of public interest and press coverage. Polar research plays a significant role in strategy documents and official statements in all the Asian countries. The Asian countries have consolidated their Arctic research efforts, with publication output, funding and infrastructure showing a marked increase from 2008. Most of this research is in the natural sciences and relates to climate change, but there is also an emerging branch of social science studies. Asian polar research still focuses more on Antarctica than the Arctic. The Asian states do not have strong military strategic interests in the Arctic Ocean, but China?s growing Arctic interest is a wake-up call for all other relevant Asian players, who do not want to see China gaining dominating positions there. The acceptance of the Asian states as permanent observers in the Arctic Council was an acknowledgment and a result of their growing interest in the region, but the decision has also spurred further engagement and a need to increase knowledge about the Arctic in these countries. At the same time it is important to keep in mind that the Arctic is not on top of the political agenda in any of the Asian countries, and that Arctic interest must be put into perspective. There is no indication in statements or in concrete activities that Asian states are challenging the fundamental rules of the game in the Arctic based on the Law of the Sea Convention.

The ultimate research question in the project is whether Asia's Arctic ascent will change the balance of interests in ways that affect the scope of action for and ability of Norway to pursue its Arctic policies. An important aspect of this question is the extent to which the promotion of these Asian states' interests in the Arctic will take a primarily cooperative form, or whether we will see challenges of various sorts to the existing norms and institutions in one or more of the issue areas under study. Asian ventures into the Arctic are in early and formative phases. There is, therefore, no immediate answer to the cooperation/confrontation question, and scholarly literature is sparse. The new research project will need to approach it step by step, acqui ring understanding first of economic, foreign and security interests and policies of the countries in question, and looking for precedents in more mature policy areas that may provide lessons for emerging positioning in the High North. The project will ad dress a broad set of issues and sectors involving a heterogeneous region as well as four Asian states that differ much in size, wealth, and political system. The project will map existing policies and activities of each of the four countries towards the A rctic region in the fields of security, energy shipping and research, drawing upon available literature, document studies and interviews in the countries and sectors in focus. Based on these existing activities and policies, the task is to identify and ex plore within each state the scope and the nature of sub-national interest in Arctic resources and affairs, as well as the foreign-policy decision-making framework in which those interests are articulated, framed, interpreted and molded into strategies rel evant to the Arctic.