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FRIHUMSAM-Fri prosj.st. hum og sam

Consciousness, Panpsychism and Integrated Information

Alternative title: Bevissthet, panpsykisme og intergrert informasjon

Awarded: NOK 2.9 mill.

Panpsychism is the view that every physical thing, from fundamental particles to humans and animals, is associated with consciousness. It is an age-old doctrine, which, to the surprise of many, has recently taken on new life within two different fields of inquiry. In philosophy, it has been argued that panpsychism offers a better account of how consciousness fits into the physical world than the traditional theories of physicalism (the view that consciousness is nothing more than physical brain processes) and dualism (the view that consciousness is non-physical, but somehow connected to some physical things, like the brain). Panpsychism avoids the reductionism of physicalism (consciousness is more than a brain process), but also the exceptionalism of dualism (consciousness is not something that set us apart from the rest of nature). In neuroscience, panpsychism follows from the Integrated Information Theory (IIT), according to which the capacity of a physical system to integrate information corresponds to its level of consciousness. This theory can explain many facts about consciousness, such as why some brain states are conscious but not others, and makes interesting predictions about, e.g., what it would take to make a conscious computer. Since all systems are associated with some integrated information, it follows that all systems are associated with (minimal) consciousness (by either being conscious, having parts that are all conscious, or itself being part of a system that is). That panpsychism receives support from two independent directions is striking. Might this be where the philosophy and science of consciousness finally come together? If so, panpsychism would promise to provide the long desired unified theory of consciousness. However, it is unclear whether the philosophical and neuroscientific versions of panpsychism are compatible. This project will investigate whether they can be unified, and show how this would lead to advantages for both theories. During the course of the project I have identified several reasons why the philosophically motivated form of panpsychism is actually not compatible with IIT, but that they can still be made compatible given minor changes to IIT (these results have been published in two different articles). This is to the benefit of panpsychism, among other things because IIT can play a role in a solution to the so-called combination problem, one of the main objections to panpsychism (this result has presented at conferences, and will hopefully soon be published in article form). It is also a benefit for IIT, as one of the most common objections to IIT is that the theory implies panpsychism and panpsychism is absurd. But the philosophically motivated form of panpsychism (known as dual-aspect or ?Russellian? panpsychism, after the philosopher Bertrand Russell who was very influential in its development) cannot be dismissed as absurd, and the same can be said for IIT if this may be the form of panpsychism it leads to. I have also been working on foundational issues with a more indirect relevance for the main theme of the project, among other things a theory I call ?the phenomenal powers view?, which says that conscious experiences, such as pain, have intrinsic causal powers in virtue of how they feel (this may sound obvious, but it actually conflicts with most standard philosophical theories on the matter) (I have published two articles on this view and its relevance for panpsychism). I have also examined the so-called axiomatic argument for IIT. Unlike other theories of consciousness in neuroscience, IIT is support not just by empirical observations and experiments, but also by a philosophical argument based on how we conceive of the structure of consciousness from our own subjective perspective. I have examined this argument in detail and proposed an interpretation that renders it more plausible (this result has been presented at conferences, and will hopefully be published in the form of an article soon).

Hovedresultatene av prosjektet er å ha vist at Integrated Information Theory (IIT), en nevrovitenskapelig teori om bevissthet, kan gjøres kompatibelt med såkalt Russelliansk panpsykisme, en filosofisk teori om bevissthet, og å ha utviklet svar på flere sentrale innvendinger mot begge teorier. Virkninger av prosjektet tror jeg vil være mer interesse for IIT og panpsykisme innen filosofi, og at panpsykisme i større grad blir ansett som en akseptabel konsekvens av nevrovitenskapelige teorier. En annen mulig virkning er å stimulere til mer tverrfaglig bevissthetsforskning som integrerer filosofiske syn som panpsykisme med resultater innen nevrovitenskap. Mine resultater viser at dette ikke hindres av klare innvendinger og kan være fruktbart. Det har også bidratt til styrkede nettverk mellom filosofi og nevrovitenskap, bl.a ved en tverrfaglig workshop organisert av prosjektet, og deltagelse på seminarer, konferanser og reising mellom mine vertsinstitusjoner.

Panpsychism is the view that every physical thing, from fundamental particles to humans and animals, is associated with consciousness. It is an age-old doctrine, which, to the surprise of many, has very recently taken on new life within two different fields of inquiry. In philosophy of mind, it has been shown that a version of panpsychism is able to solve some of the most serious problems that confront the more traditional positions of materialism and dualism, such as the "hard problem" of consciousness and the problem of mental causation (Chalmers forthcoming-b; Strawson 2006). In neuroscience, a form of panpsychism follows as a consequence of the Integrated Information Theory (Tononi 2008), a new fundamental theory of consciousness which has proved to have great explanatory and predictive power. That panpsychism receives support from two so different and independent directions is striking. Might panpsychism be where the philosophy and science of consciousness finally come together? If so, panpsychism would promise to provide the long desired unified theory of consciousness. However, it is unclear whether the philosophical and the scientific versions of panpsychism are compatible. In this project, I aim to uncover and clarify the most important indications of their incompatibility. Then I will propose three ways in which the theories may nevertheless be unified, and show that in virtue of such unification central problems that face each theory in isolation can be overcome. The project will be undertaken in close collaboration with David Chalmers, who has contributed importantly to the revival of panpsychism in philosophy, and Giulio Tononi, who originally developed the Integrated Information Theory of Consciousness. I will spend time as a visiting researcher at both their respective institutions and associated research centers, the Center for Mind, Brain and consciousness at New York University, and the Center for Sleep and Consciousness at U. Wisconsin-Madison

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FRIHUMSAM-Fri prosj.st. hum og sam