Back to search

UTENRIKS-Internasjonale forhold - utenriks- og sikkerhetspolitikk og norske interesser

Russian policies of influence in the populist-pragmatic nexus

Alternative title: Russisk politikk for innflytelse mellom populisme og pragmatisme

Awarded: NOK 5.9 mill.

Russia is among the large number of states that engage with target groups abroad to further their national interest. Russia’s engagement is controversial due to the country’s gradual turn towards conservative authoritarianism and aggressive military activities abroad. The PRORUSS project (“Russian Policies of Influence in the Populist-Pragmatic Nexus”) started out in 2020. Since 2014, Russia had annexed Crimea and assisted two separatist statelets on Ukrainian territory in Donbas. In other words, PRORUSS started up six years after Russia’s blatant infringements on basic international law. Nonetheless, at the time – in 2020 – Putin’s Russia enjoyed some attraction in other parts of Europe. PRORUSS set out to study this attraction along to lines, pragmatism and ideology. What the PRORUSS project set out to study was the cooperation, contacts, links, alliances between Russian actors and actors in other European countries. This is often associated with shady affairs and covert influence operations. Indeed, many interesting studies have been made along those lines. Our point of departure was that we found that covert deals and covert operations of influence would only be part of the picture. So, the PRORUSS focus has been on what takes place in the open. When the PRORUSS project started out, Europe’s energy cooperation with Russia was ongoing for full for pragmatic reasons. For reasons of ideological attraction, Marine le Pen printed a million leaflets with a picture of her and Putin shaking hands to be used in the upcoming presidential elections in 2022. The project started out with two main hypotheses. The first hypothesis was based on the composition of the Russian governing apparatus and the need to balance between internal factions. In the broadest sense, the Russian power apparatus has been divided over the question of whether to primarily turn to populists or pragmatists as partners. The second hypothesis was based on the heterogeneity of the 'catchment area' of audiences and actors abroad that would potentially be receptive to Russia’s initiatives of attraction. The hypothesis was discussed through four empirical case studies that together reflect the above-mentioned configurations and internal rivalries. The two cases on energy and sanctions mainly involve pragmatic considerations whereas the two cases on the Ukraine crisis and moral conservatism primarily relate to populist discourses. The main focus has been on interaction between Russian and Norwegian actors. In addition, Russian interaction with other European countries, in particular Germany and Poland and Germany has been addressed. One article has been published on dissenting Norwegian media discourses on Russia’s annexation of Crimea, and another article is about to be published on whether morally conservative Russian positions resonate among like-minded (morally conservative) Norwegians. Yet another article is about to be published about the general attitudes to Putin and Russia among Norwegians. Are Northern Norwegians more inclined to continue cooperation with Russia than others? In neither of the studies on the reception of Russian populist rhetoric in Norway, PRORUSS found resonance. The populist nexus does not reach out to a Norwegian audience, but we found that Norway’s official policies towards Russia gradually softened between 2014 and 2022. One article from the project is on how liberal pragmatists in Germany, Poland and the Netherlands saw energy interdependence as a conflict-preventing measure and how the so-called “hard core realists” saw energy dependence on Russia less as interdependence than as a possible source of strategic threat. Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 impacted heavily on PRORUSS’ study object. The nexus shrinked. Two scientific articles will be published from PRORUSS on how the 2022 invasion changed the pragmatic-populist nexus. As part of the project, an article has been written on how the Russian authorities now make use of the sanctions imposed on them to nurture a kind of what we call state populism.

Russia's large scale military attack on Ukraine 24 February 2022 impacted heavily on the PRORUSS project's object of study. The pragmatic-populist nexus of contacts and cooperation between Russian and other European actors and institutions shrinked but at the same time public interest in the phenomenon grew. Findings and insights from the research carried out as part of the project were in high demand. As a result, the project team member have been given ample opportunities to contribute to a better informed debate and decision-making, which was a major objective to be reached by PRORUSS. Team members have taken part in numerous meetings and seminars, tv and radio programmes, podcasts. A large number of newspaper interviews and op-eds result from the project. Among others, PRORUSS has arranged panels and workshop at meeting-places, like Arendalsuka and Barents Spektakel. The project's final workshop at Litteraturhuset was open for the public and was well attended, also by mass media. Insights from the project has been shared with peers and decisionmakers through the RUSSNET network.

The PRORUSS research project ("Russian policies of influence in the populist-pragmatic nexus") is about the Russian power apparatus' potential impact through its appeal to populists and pragmatists in Norway and other European countries. The project's basis hypothesis is that the inconsistencies in the Russian power apparatus and the heterogeneity of its potential audiences abroad set limits to Russia’s influence. The hypothesis is discussed through four empirical case studies that together reflect the configuration and internal rivalries inside the Russian regime and its audiences alike. The cases are the "pragmatist" issues of energy and sanctions and the "populist" issues of moral conservativism and official Russian rhetorics on Ukraine. The findings from the four cases will be synthesized in order to grasp the breadth and inter-linkages of the issues that makes Russia potentially attractive to a variety of audiences abroad, the inherent contradiction of these offers as well as the vulnerability of Russia's appeal given the large variation in its potential audiences abroad. Doing this, the project will draw on and contribute to the scholarly literture on International Relations, soft power, populism and Russian Studies. The societal impact will consist in enhancing the analytical capacities of four different target groups mainly in Norway but also in other European countries having relations with Russian actors: 1) authorities, 2) the business community, 3) civil society, and 4) the general public.

Publications from Cristin

No publications found

Funding scheme:

UTENRIKS-Internasjonale forhold - utenriks- og sikkerhetspolitikk og norske interesser