Elite Political Dynamics in Electoral Autocracies

In ELITE, we study political elites in authoritarian competitive regimes. We aim to examine how they make strategic decisions to advance their own careers and what the consequences of these decisions are for the political system as a whole and for society at large. The project is divided into three themes: First, we will study the interactions between members of parliament and the presidential administration (the cabinet) to better understand how the cohesion within political parties is strengthened or weakened by politicians’ decisions. Political parties are crucial for holding governments and presidents accountable for the policies they implement. In ELITE, we work on studying the cohesion and strength of parliamentarians in various non-democratic regimes. Second, we examine whether and, if so, how judges adjust their rulings to political influence. We focus on rulings related to electoral petitions and study whether there is evidence of political bias in courts’ rulings of which cases to pursue as well as the final outcomes of these cases. We seek to understand what explains why judges sometimes rule independently of political influence and why they sometimes yield to political interests. This has implications for the development of the rule of law, which is central to a modern political and economic system. Third, we will study how politicians’ competition for careers affects development. Politicians must compete for voters’ support in elections, but also for party leaders' favor to be nominated to electoral lists or to receive necessary resources for their voters. The interests of party leaders and voters are often in conflict, forcing politicians to balance various considerations. Different regimes set different frameworks for this balancing act, such as by influencing freedom of expression and organization during elections. Therefore, it is unclear whether electoral competition and the desire for re-election are sufficient to discipline politicians' behavior across regimes. In ELITE, we study whether and how voters use their ballots to hold their representatives accountable for the voters' economic circumstances. To study these issues, ELITE uses empirical data from Zambian politics. We are in the process of systematizing data on the political and legal system in Zambia. In collaboration with the National Assembly Library of Zambia, we have digitized all parliamentary debates back to 1924. We have compiled a complete, daily dataset on ministers, and the complete list of parliament members since 1924. We have geolocated polling stations from the last three elections, along with the election results at each station. This has been combined with data on agricultural production, central to the Zambian economy. Finally, we have systematized information on all election petitions and their outcomes. With this data, ELITE can test a range of assumptions about colonial states, party dictatorships, and authoritarian competitive regimes, and combine systematic statistical models with deep contextual knowledge.

The aim of ELITE is to study the rank-and-file of political elites in electoral autocracies, and how their strategic interaction affects the overall political system and societal outcomes. The project is divided between three areas of interest. First, we will study the interaction among members of parliament and the executive branch to understand the conditions under which the unity of permanently organized parties is promoted or hindered. Political parties are among the most important institutions for functioning accountability in political systems, but their development is not well understood. Second, we will study the strategic interaction between judges and politicians that explain why judges sometimes are empowered to rule independent from government interests and why the judiciary sometimes instead defers to the interests of the regime. This has implications for the rule of law which is an essential institution for a modern political and economic system. Third, we will study the effect of elite competition on human development. It remains unclear whether electoral competition in electoral autocracies are sufficient to motivate politicians to invest in their electorate, which we will study directly in ELITE. To accomplish this, ELITE will focus on an in-depth look at the Zambian political system. Due to an exceptional data availability from this country, ELITE can produce unique insights about elite dynamics in this specific political system. This allows the project to dig into many of the standard assumptions in the literature, and tests these in rigorous, large-N setups combined with deep contextual knowledge. Overall, the project will result in at least 8 journal articles, 2 policy briefs, 4 unique datasets on political institutions in Zambia, and a workshop. Hosted at PRIO, the project brings together research talent with complementary and different backgrounds and establishes a network with Zambian researchers.