Over the past decade, democracies around the world have come under serious attack. Countries such as Hungary, Russia, India, Turkey, the USA, Burundi, and Venezuela have recently moved in a more authoritarian direction, through restrictions on, among other things, civil rights, press freedom, free elections, and judicial independence. In recent times, such restrictions on democracy have often been orchestrated by democratically elected political leaders, who gradually concentrate power in their own hands. In many cases, these attempts to seize power have been met with strong resistance from citizens who want to defend democracy. Other times, citizens have largely tacitly accepted the limitations on democracy, and many aspiring autocratic leaders have remained extremely popular even after implementing anti-democratic measures. This project raises the following questions: When and why will citizens defend democracy against aspiring autocratic leaders? To answer this, the DefDem project studies the cognitive processes that shape individuals' preferences and decisions on how they will react to hypothetical and actual attacks on democracy. We look at how loyal ordinary citizens and elites are, at their core, to democratic principles - including how willing they are to accept undemocratic behavior from other politicians in exchange for other political preferences. This will be analyzed using surveys and lab experiments of ordinary citizens and elites in countries such as Norway, Turkey, Hungary, and England. The project will also study why and when citizens will participate in mass mobilization against leaders with undemocratic behavior.
The forthcoming findings from the project shed new light on citizens' commitment to democracy and democratic principles. For example, we show that even in an apparently robust democracy like Norway, a surprisingly large proportion of ordinary citizens are willing to tolerate politicians who break with democratic principles. This is especially true for the youngest generation (those between 18-25). Furthermore, we find in a study of citizens across 30 different countries that although most are concerned that countries should hold political elections, they place little emphasis on other aspects of democracy, such as institutional constraints on elected officials or civil rights. Another important finding is that support for strong leaders with authoritarian tendencies is something that spreads socially: Through field experiments in Norway, we show that socializing with other citizens who support authoritarian leaders makes one more open to this themselves. This may indicate that authoritarian tendencies can spread relatively quickly among citizens even in a country like Norway - if the population becomes aware that others are more open to this than previously assumed.
The last decade has seen several alarming setbacks for global democracy. Countries as diverse as Hungary, India, Russia, Turkey, the United States, Burundi and Venezuela have recently moved away from democracy by increasing restrictions on civil liberties, press freedom and judicial independence. Current processes of democratic erosion are often orchestrated by elected political executives, who gradually concentrate poewr in their own hands. In many instances, attempts at power-grabbing have been confronted with fierce resistance by citizens seeking to defend democracy. Other times, citizens have largely stayed silent in the face of democratic erosion, and aspiring autocrats have remained highly popular even after restricting democracy. This project asks: When and why will citizens defend democracy from attacks by aspiring autocrats? While an increasing body of literature explores the processes through which leaders concentrate power, the conditions under which (some) citizens will react against attacks by incumbents, through for instance popular mobilization or withdrawing support from the leader, remains poorly understood. We will fill this gap by analysing the prevalence and explanations of 1) citizens’ commitments to democratic principles – including willingness to trade off democracy against other concerns – and 2) citizens’ participation in mass mobilization against democratic erosion. We take a micro-level approach, by studying the cognitive processes of individual preference-formation and decision-making in response to hypothetical and real attacks on democracy, and how these processes are influenced by the nature and trajectory of democratic erosion. Drawing on a combination of survey and lab- experiments and macro-level events data on sequences of democratic erosion, the project will add sorely needed insights to our understanding of when democratically elected leaders can undermine democracy – and when citizens will prevent it.