Right-wing populism and the political feasibility of climate policy

The rise of Right-wing populism (RWP) has contributed to political polarisation over climate policy in many countries, which has generated or exacerbated political gridlock and thwarted the development of climate policies that are consistent with the Paris Agreement 2015. This project investigates the nature of the linkages between RWP and opposition to climate science and policy as well as the drivers of this association through a cross-national study of Norway, Germany, the USA and Australia. Combining both quantitative and qualitative methods, the project integrates both bottom-up psychological explanations and top-down structural and mobilization explanations to explain the performance of different predictors of opposition to climate science and policy. In the nascent literature on the association between RWP and climate opposition, two different explanations have been suggested. A structuralist explanation points to a common cause for the two phenomena, namely structural changes in the global economy. The other explanation draws on the ideological content of RWP, especially its antagonism between ‘the people’ and a cosmopolitan elite, arguing that climate policy takes on a symbolic role in this perceived conflict. The objectives of the project are to: 1) Conduct and analyze a survey to test the two explanations for RWP opposition to climate policy among voters across the four countries, 2) explore and explain the opposition to climate policy in RWP parties and in other parties with RWP factions, 3) explore the relative importance of privileged versus marginalized groups as drivers of RWP supporters’ opposition to climate policy, 4) explore how the strength of resistance from RWP supporters varies across different questions relating to climate science and policy and across time, 5) explore and explain the relationship between RWP attitudes and attitudes toward nature conservation among voters, and 6) propose options for responding to RWP opposition to climate policies based on POPCLIM’s diagnosis and research results Preliminary results regarding selected objectives: 1) Two different structural equation modeling analyses of the Popclim survey data both indicate clear support for the ideological explanation over the structuralist explanation. The analysis also shows that it’s the nationalist component more than the populist component of RWP attitudes that is particularly strongly linked to opposing climate policy. 2) The case study of Australia has found that RWP rhetoric in arguments against climate policy by members of the mainstream rightwing Liberal-National Coalition. This rhetoric is remarkably similar to that of the prototype RWP party Pauline Hanson’s One Nation. 3) The survey analysis has shown that climate policy opposition is second only to immigration attitudes in predicting who votes for RWP parties. This suggests that the climate position of these parties is anchored among and demanded by their voters. Secondly, the analysis found that marginalization is not a key determinant neither of climate policy opposition, RWP attitudes, nor RWP party voting. Among people with RWP attitudes, it is not the most marginalized who demand climate policy opposition. Finally, observed cross-country variation in the strength of the link between nativism and climate policy opposition is consistent with the thesis that the corporate-funded climate change denial countermovement’ activities and messages activate this connection among individuals with certain psychological predispositions. 5) While the survey shows that people with RWP attitudes are on average less supportive of nature conservation than other people are, the difference is not as larges as when it comes to climate policy. The only instance where we find that RWP attitudes is positively linked with support for nature conservation, is when when respondents are asked to prioritize nature conservation versus renewable energy development.

Right-wing populism (RWP) has been on the rise in many democracies and has become an entrenched long-lasting force across the world that will continue to shape politics. Extant studies have found that RWP is linked with opposition to climate policy but has not come far in explaining this opposition. Diagnosing the opposition is necessary for facilitating a more constructive inclusion of these groups in climate policy debates. In the nascent literature on the association between RWP and climate opposition, two different explanations have been suggested. A structuralist explanation points to a common cause for the two phenomena, namely structural changes in the global economy. The other explanation draws on the ideological content of RWP and argues that the effect of structural changes on climate policy attitudes is not direct, but rather mediated by RWP ideology. WP1 of this project will design a survey to test the two explanations for RWP opposition to climate policy among voters across four countries (Australia, Germany, Norway, USA) and conduct mediation analysis. WP2 will explore climate opposition among RWP parties and party fractions in the same countries. The two explanations will be tested through a combination of qualitative process tracing and quantitative content analysis. WP3 will investigate the relative importance of privileged versus marginalized groups as drivers of RWP supporters’ opposition to climate policy. Different complementary analyses will be conducted, using data both from WP1 and WP2. WP4 will explore how the strength of resistance from RWP supporters varies across different questions relating to climate science and policy and across time. It will draw on four years of data from a panel survey in Norway. WP5 will integrate policy implications from the results of WP1-4, proposing ways to craft climate policies to be politically feasible despite increasing RWP opposition.