Bargaining for Non-Participation? Two-level Games and US Behaviour in the Climate Negotiations

Putnam's theory of two-level games has received widespread attention in the literature on international cooperation. According to this theory, negotiators will look ahead and only consider treaty designs that are likely to achieve ratification in all majo r participating countries. Interestingly, evidence from the climate negotiations does not support this prediction. In particular, it appears that the concern for ratification by the U.S. Senate did not play a central role in the negotiations. Using this o bservation as a point of departure, this project will: 1. Explain why the strict ratification requirement in the U.S. Senate apparently did noy play a major role as leverage for US negotiators in the climate negotiations. 2. Compare the United States' str ategy in the climate negotiations to its strategy in other international environmental negotiations. 3. Provide a better understanding of the link between domestic politics and US climate policy at the international level. 4. Identify the extent to which the strict ratification requirement in the U.S. Senate was a concern for the negotiators of other countries (in particular, Germany and Norway). 5. Explain why major concessions with a view to ensure US ratification were not made during the climate negot iations. 6. Explain why the concern for ratification apparently became a major concern for other countries only after President Bush?s repudiation of Kyoto. 7. Develop further the theory of two-level games in light of evidence from the climate negotiation s. 8. Use the findings to draw inferences about negotiation strategy, including how "climate pushers" might accomplish their goal of re-engaging the United States internationally.