Concept Formation and Knowledge in Early Greek Stoicism.

This doctoral thesis will contribute to the scholarship by giving an account of the function of preconceptions (prolepseis) in the theory of knowledge and concept formation in Early Greek Stoicism. In Early Greek Stoicism, preconceptions (prolepseis) have two essential roles. On the one hand, they are responsible for the formation of concepts from impressions. We are told that the mature rational mind, which is characterized by the capacity for language, is constituted by preconceptions and conceptions. O n the other hand, we are told that preconceptions are criteria of truth for beliefs and judgments. Stoic virtue is only possible if the agent is wise, and wisdom is only possible if all his beliefs are true. Thus, preconceptions are necessary for wisdom a nd virtue. The main hypothesis that will be defended is that the two roles of preconceptions are inextricably linked, which is an aspect that has been insufficiently addressed in the extant literature. I will argue that the formation of preconceptions is best explained by an empiricist account where preconceptions arise as a result of repeated impressions of external, physical objects. The Stoic metaphysics of mind and nature is thoroughly materialist, and I will argue that the content of a preconception has three aspects, one physiological, one intentional and one propositional. A proper account of the function of preconceptions as criteria of truth must encompass all three aspect, and this can only be done by taking both roles of the preconception into consideration. The research will be submitted as a doctoral thesis for the Ph. D. degree in Philosophy at UC Santa Barbara, USA, with partial results submitted for review to philosophical journals and conferences. As a student in the Ph. D. program at UC SB, I have been and will be responsible for undergraduate courses in ancient philosophy, philosophy of mind, metaphysics and epistemology.