Legal Culture and Anti-Corruption Reform: The Case of the West Balkans

The key finding from Fafo's three legal culture projects is that attitudes towards law (i.e. "law-in-principle") amongst legal outsiders and insiders are remarkably similar across Europe (Western Europe; Eastern Europe; the West Balkans). Perceptions (i.e. "law-in-practice"), on the other hand, differ by country. What is more, there is often a correlation between GDP (PPP) per capita, score on the World Bank's Rule of Law Index, and perceptions: in countries where GDP (PPP) per capita and the score on the World Bank's Rule of Law Index are high, legal outsiders and insiders tend to have more positive perceptions of the individuals and institutions making, implementing and enforcing the law, than in countries where they are low. One of the most important findings from the Balkan legal culture project is that most ordinary citizens equal corruption with "bribery". Almost none of them mention "nepotism". Anti-corruption efforts in the region tend to target bribery. However, nepotism is a potentially much more dangerous phenomenon than bribe-taking and bribe-giving. Project data show that the habit of protecting and promoting one's own people - particularly in terms of providing them with jobs - is widespread throughout the West Balkans. Knowing the right people is not sufficient to obtain a good job: a bribe is often also necessary. Citizens in the West Balkans condemn such hiring practices: they prefer people to be hired by merit rather than by whom they know and/or how much money they have. At the same time - and given high levels of unemployment - they excuse such hiring practices: people need jobs to feed their families and therefore have no choice but to resort to connections and bribes. The downside of such informal hiring practices is that i) the best qualified people are not always employed, and (ii) those who have acquired their position by means of connections and/or bribes have to return the favour and recover the money paid. This, in turn, not only negatively affects productivity and competitiveness, but also hinders fair treatment by state employees and promotes corruption. Legal insiders in the West Balkans do not find it acceptable to give bribes in any situations - nor do they approve of people obtaining jobs through their contacts rather than by merit. However, they note that without connections and bribes it is very difficult to achieve something in their respective countries. To reduce corruption in the West Balkans anti-corruption measures should not only target bribe-taking and bribe-giving as such, but also informal hiring practices - especially in the public sector. Further, it should be noted that legal outsiders in the West Balkans do not perceive NGOs as a legitimate participant in anti-corruption reform. This finding largely confirms the skepticism towards NGOs voiced by citizens in the West Balkans for our previous project on Balkan NGOs: NGOs are predominantly viewed as organisations that promote their own, private interests rather than those of society at large. Our finding thus contrasts sharply with the established view that NGOs have a great role to play in anti-corruption efforts. Legal insiders, for their part, believe that organised religion has a part to play in anti-corruption efforts in the West Balkans - though they acknowledge that religious leaders are sometimes corrupt and thus unable to provide people with a good example to be followed. Both legal insiders and outsiders believe that institutions tasked with reducing corruption in the West Balkans are capable of achieving results. But that the actual will to introduce effective anti-corruption measures is at best limited, at worst absent altogether. Another finding worth mentioning is that most legal insiders do not consider European legal transfers to be imposed upon the West Balkans. Then the countries in this region are actively seeking EU membership. Adjusting their laws and regulations to the EU is thus the price to be paid in order to acheive this aim. However, some legal insiders question the appropriateness of introducing Western-style legislation in their countries - given very different socio-economic conditions.

While quite a lot is known about corruption and anti-corruption efforts in post-communist states, we know less about the impact of anti-corruption reform. Such reform is, as a rule, initiated by the international community. However, so far no systematic study on how anti-corruption reform interacts with the broader cultural, legal, political and socio-economic context into which it is introduced, has been undertaken. Our previous study of informal practice in the West Balkans investigated the opportunit y structures motivating, and the informal mechanisms facilitating, corruption in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Serbia from the point of view of the elites. They perceived informal practice primarily as a result of national culture and to a lesse r extent as a result of the socialist experience, transition and war. The project will take our research on informal practice and corruption one step further by investigating (i) the legal culture into which anti-corruption reform is introduced, (ii) th e anti-corruption reform measures themselves, and (iii) the interaction between (i) and (ii) in Kosovo, Macedonia and Serbia, respectively. More specifically, we will contrast the views of (a) legal insiders and legal outsiders (for definitions, see page 5), and (b) the ethnic/religious titular and minority groups, on five key dimensions of legal culture, as well as on corruption and on anti-corruption efforts. The project offers an alternative and novel approach to the study of anti-corruption reform in post-communist states more generally, and in the West Balkans in particular. What is more, it represents the first systematic attempt to (i) provide an analysis of legal culture; and (ii) investigate anti-corruption reform as a legal transplant, in th e West Balkans. Data generated by the project will be of interest both to academics and policy makers working (a) legal culture, (b) EU integration, and (c) corruption.