Intra-household resource allocation and targeted transfers

Mange velferdprogrammer i både rike og fattige land velger å overføre ressurser til kvinnen i husholdningen framfor mannen. Et eksempel på dette er norsk barnetrygd som automatisk overføres til barnets mor uavhengig av mor of fars deltakelse i arbeidsmarkedet og tidsbruk sammen med barnet. Mange internasjonale utviklingsprogrammer velger også å fokusere på mor framfor far, eller kvinner framfor menn, eksempel er mange av "conditional cash transfer" programmene (betingete overføringsprogrammer) som verdensbanken og private donorer driver i utviklingsland. Argumenter for å overføre til kvinner i steden for menn, er at slike overføring styrker kvinner og barns posisjon. Men, til tross for at store programmer velger å fokusere på kvinner istedenfor menn, finnes lite forskning for å underbygge at et slikt fokus faktist styrker kvinner og barns posisjon. Dette forsknigsprosjektet skal bidra til å skaffe tilveie slik forskning. Prosjektet vil bruke ny metoder både innefor survey design og eksperimenter og framskaffe empirisk datagrunnlag i flere land som er ulike både når det gjelder inntektsnivå og barn og kvinners posisjon i samfunnet.

A significant fraction of governmental programs, welfare arrangements, and cash transfer programs target women. In matters related to children, most countries have a long tradition of targeting mothers. For example, in Norway, the child benefits are automatically paid to mothers and 90% of the recipients are mothers. The main reasoning behind policies that target mothers is that they promote gender equality, empower women, increase investments in children, and improve child welfare. This can be formalized into two arguments; (i) the maternal argument states that women are more likely to spend money on goods and services that benefit children than men are, and (ii) the empowerment argument states that targeting women will increase their control over resources in the household and therefore empower them. The empirical evidence on how targeted transfers affect household allocations and child outcomes is still limited, and we know very little about the mechanisms that generate any such impacts. The aim of this project is to start to close this gap in the literature by advancing on the measurements, providing novel evidence on the effect of targeted transfer policies on household resource allocation, and study underlying mechanisms, in data collection effort in five countries and a comparative study of 15 countries. To do so, we will (i) develop, harmonize and validate measures that can be used in different contexts to elicit effects on children of targeting mothers, and (ii) improve on survey measures of women’s intra-household bargaining power and develop better elicitation methods of power in the household decision making. Using these improved measurement techniques will allow us to understand whether the maternal and empowerment arguments are valid, and if so in which contexts, offering innovative insights and significant results that will be important for science and policy.