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MARINFORSK-Marine ressurser og miljø

Economic Efficiency and Distribution in a regional perspective:Norwegian Fisheries (Reseracher project-BIONÆR)

Awarded: NOK 8.3 mill.

-This project is based on the strict management regime for the conduct of commercial fisheries and how the fishers adapt to different regulations. We focus especially on technological adaptations,the economic effects, aspects related to the resource allocation policy among different vessel groups and the incrreasing transferability of the quota regime. In the first part of the project we investigate potential effecincy gains related to a possible liberalization of present fishing gear regulations. We find that more liberal fishing gear regulations may be introduced within the frame of a sustainable resource management. Further, as different fishing gear represents different effeciencies, more liberal gear adaptations may represent en economic efficiency gains for the fisheres. Different fishing gear also represent different fuel consumption. Frredom to choose different fishing gears, may thus contribute to more environmental friendly fisheries. However, as fishing gear regulations are directly connected to the resource allocation regime among groups, more liberal gear regulations may challenge the letimacy of the resource allocation regime. In the next section, we focus on the structural changes of the fishing fleetand the fleet. The fleet are subject to radical changes, in terms of fewer and bigger vessels. Most noteably,increasing numbers of coastal vessels have become deep sea vessels, but their quota base stems from the coastal vessel group. In the third sction, we investigate the effects from the transferable quota regime and how the new regime have affected structural features of the fishing fleet. Here, we have gained access to unique data from the Fisheries Directorate to study the effects from increased transferability of the quota regime, the rate of quota/vessel transactions for each gear and vessel group and the aggregate effects for the total fishing fleet. We find that the rate of quota transactions show significant differencies among different gear and vessel groups, which again have affected the numbers of vessels within each group in a radical different manner.Consequently, as the resource allocation regime are stable among groups, the fish resources are concentrated to steadily fewer vessels within each group respectively. The increased market orientation of the quota regime combined with a step-wise liberalization of vessel size restrictions for the coastal fleet, have also led to changes of the fleet structure within the coastal fleet. Today, more than 60 vessels above 28 meters hold a quota-base from the coastal vessel fleet, a motion which indicate that a deep sea fleet (in terms of physical size) is rapidly growing within the the coastal fleet group. In an institutional perspective, we find that a potential liberalization of present gear and vessel restriction and the market orientation of the quota regime, challenges the legitimacy of the resource allocation regime. However, rules for scrapping vessels are mandatory for each quota/vessel transaction. These rules have constructed an "artifical" market for scrapping objects, and imposed severe transaction costs to the buyers of tradeable qutas. This arrangement stands in sharp contrast to the use of the market mechanism to obtain efficiency gains via the use of market transactions. The reduction in numbers of vessels and the concentration of quotas to steadily fewer actors, have launched a debate about introducing a possible resource tax from fisheries to the scociety. However, in order to realize a resource tax, the numbers of actors must be reduced by further transactions among actors. As fisheries have gained increased econimic efficiency during the last decade, fisheries as investment object, have gained increased interest from outsiders which do not fullfill the legal status of being a fisherman.in this context, possible gear- and vessel libaralization and increased tradeability of the quota regime, not only relates to structural changes within the fleet, but also challenge the most central elements of management regime.

Norwegian fisheries are regarded as a closed and strictly regulated sector.Besides producing TACs in order to protect fish stocks, the allocation of fish resources represent the corner stone of the management regime. The allocation principles connects to the institutionalisation of different technological adaptations, i.e. preserve a diverse fleet structure, restricting trawl fisheries and restrictions based on technical specifications. Thus, allocation of fish resources represent the main reference to im portant regional- and national political aims. The locked in technological adaptations generates substantially different efficiency levels, both within- and between different gear- and vessel groups. Herein, we propose a project to investigate the poten tial efficiency gains among different gear-and vessel groups from deregulations of resource allocation and technical regulations. Further, the project accounts for the institutional implications of regulatory changes, in order to oprationalize potential e fficiency gains at the regional level. The project runs for three years (july 2014-july 2017). The research team will be affiliated with SINTEF Fisheries (SFH), the Norwegian University of Life Sciences, the University of Stavanger, the University of Ice land and the University of California at Davis, USA.

Publications from Cristin

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Funding scheme:

MARINFORSK-Marine ressurser og miljø