FRIHUMSAM-Fri prosj.st. hum og sam

The project has resulted in seven published and two as-of-yet unpublished articles and papers that advance the main objective on three fronts: development of the method of transcendentally idealistic metaphysics, separation of truth and existence involved in this method, and application of this method to specific metaphysical questions. Four articles have been published n in international peer-reviewed journals, two are undergoing such peer-review, and three are published or forthcoming in scientific anthologies. Two critical notes/reviews on recently published books on these topics have also been published. The articles have the following aims. 1: To prove that the so-called transcendental arguments constitute a valid method of metaphysics if and only if transcendental idealism is presupposed or established. This method is also sufficient for demarcating metaphysics from other sciences that employ different methods. (Forthcoming in an anthology.) The following two articles concern the relationship between truth and existence: 2: To explicate how Kant's conception of existence opposes his predecessors and how one cannot use logic alone to establish metaphysical truths, as the latter requires proof of existence and the former is independent of existence. (Published in Kant-Studien.) 3: To contrast Kant's and Frege's views of existence and to show how on this score Kant's transcendentally idealistic metaphysics and its method differ substantially from loosely Frege-based contemporary metaphysics. (Published in Synthese.) The rest apply Kant's philosophical method to metaphysic in general and metaphysics of mind, causality, and agency (freedom) in particular: 4: To show that Kripke's so-called a posteriori necessity is really a priori necessity in the classical sense and thereby to contribute to contemporary discussion about the method of metaphysics as well as to defend Kant and his relevance against Kripke's critique. (In review.) 5: To show how the separation of truth and existence undermines any attempt to prove metaphysical results about the soul, including that it would not exist. In contemporary context this provides an argument against reductive theories of mind such as physicalism and panpsychism. (Published in Kant-Studien.) 6: To show that Kant's transcendental argumentation can formally pinpoint the fallacy of rationalistic metaphysics about the soul. (In review.) 7: To show that rationalistic metaphysics of the soul is grounded on two different methods that fail in their own right, hence providing support for applying Kant's alternative method. (Published in an anthology.) 8: To explicate Kant's argument and method for proving that causal relations in nature are invariable, lawful, and necessary, and hence that nature is governed by causal determinism. (Published in Kant-Studien.) 9: To show how free will is metaphysically compatible with deterministic nature in transcendental idealism. This will in the future help to demarcate between natural science, metaphysics, and ethics, and to justify their mutual independence as sciences. (Forthcoming in an anthology.) These articles take different approaches to the same problem: is there a special method of metaphysics, can the method be used reliably to ground metaphysical truths, what specific truths can be derived, and what kind of restrictions apply to them.

This project will apply Kant's theory of modality (possibility, actuality, and necessity) to develop a viable alternative to contemporary theories in metaphysics of modality. Modal notions are indispensable for contemporary metaphysics. Although metaphysi cs of modality has been widely discussed, there are no Kantian approaches. The main aim is to show that Kant's modal metaphysics constitutes a strong and highly original competitor to existing theories. As Kant's transcendental idealism (TI) is commonly considered problematic, to support my view I will (a) show that his transcendental arguments and TI are designed to demarcate between scientific and pseudo-scientific metaphysics, and hence that (b) rather than refuting metaphysics, TI is a meta-metaphysi cal (methodological) theory that on the contrary makes moderate yet robust, objective and realistic metaphysics possible. I will also show that TI is compatible with and even supports scientific (empirical) realism. I will then analyse and clarify Kant's theory of modality in contemporary terms and show that it enables (c) a critique of certain contemporary methodologies of metaphysics, exemplified by Lewis's modal realism, (d) a defence against Kripke's (1970) a posteriori necessity that appears to be a challenge to Kant's view that all necessity is a priori, and (e) an intricate possible worlds semantics that is similar to contemporary views (especially Hintikka 1973), and that can be used to defend the combinatorial interpretation of possible worlds (p roposed by e.g. Armstrong 1989). This model of possible worlds further (f) provides a Kantian solution to the central problem of transworld identity. Finally, Kant's analysis of and demarcation between logical and real (metaphysical) modality can be used (g) to set additional criteria for using the S5 system of modal logic in metaphysics and to show that some famous and controversial arguments (e.g. Plantinga 1974) fail due to violation of the criteria.