Innocently Benefiting from Injustice

Abstract The project ?Innocently Benefiting from Injustice? (IBI) has aimed to provide theoretical and practical analysis of an important aspect of moral and political theory, namely the question of whether, and to what extent, an agent can acquire compensatory (or rectificatory) duties in virtue simply of being an innocent beneficiary of injustice. Innocent beneficiaries are not involved in any way in the injustice itself. They are merely enriched through the injustice, through no fault or choice of their own. We refer to the idea that agents can have such duties as the Beneficiary Principle (BP). Understanding this principle is important for understanding the nature of our duties as moral agents. Gauging the moral significance of the BP is of particular importance when considering cases where some agents have innocently benefited, or are benefiting from injustice, and where those that contributed to the injustice itself are either unwilling or unable to rectify it. Examples of this sort include differential burdens and benefits arising from human-induced climate change, historic injustices (such as colonialism), and unjust arrangements of international trade and economic cooperation. During the project, three major international conferences has been organized. First, an international conference 'Benefiting from Injustice' took place on October 10th and 11th 2013, at the Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs in New York. The conference brought together leading political theorists throughout the world for a focused two-day discussion of the project?s theme. It was co-sponsored by the Carnegie Council and the Australian Research Council. Second, a workshop on Benefiting from Injustice was arranged at the Center for the Study of Mind in Nature (CSMN) at the University of Oslo, on May 29th and 30th, 2014. Third, a further international conference `the Beneficiary Pays Principle` was held on May 26th and 27th, 2016. The conference was held at `the Centre for the Study of Mind in Nature`, University of Oslo. The conference brought together leading thinker on the subject to examining and critic the beneficiary pays principal. In addition to these three events, a smaller internal project-workshop was arranged at the University of Oslo May 28, 2017. Here, again, papers gauging the normative plausibility of the BP were presented and discussed. At all these conferences, leading theorists has gotten together for fruitful discussions of applied and theoretical aspects of the beneficiary principle. The papers presented have included theoretical discussions of the normative plausibility of various versions of the principle, the bases and limits of obligations based on benefiting from injustice, the relationship between the BP and other principles of justice, empirical studies of peoples? attitudes to the principle, and more applied issues such as the degree to which beneficiaries of colonial imposition have duties to relinquish or make amends in light of their receiving territories that were acquired through injustice. All in all, the project has shed considerable light on the BP. Through books, articles, chapters, media appearences and teaching, many aspects of the principle has been analysed. In addition, many workshop participants have published articles that has been presented at the conferences. These publications have analyzed many theoretical and applied dimensions of the BP. Further, an anthology based on the contributions to the 2016 workshop is planned. A proposal is under review at a leading international press.

The project aims to provide theoretical and practical analysis of an important, but so far insufficiently studied aspect of moral and political theory, namely the question of whether, and to what extent, an agent can acquire compensatory or rectificatory duties in virtue of being an innocent beneficiary of injustice. Innocent beneficiaries are not involved in any way in the injustice itself. They are merely enriched through the injustice. We refer to the idea that agents can have such duties as the Benefi ciary Principle. Understanding this principle is important for understanding the nature of our duties as moral agents. Gauging the moral significance of the Beneficiary Principle is of particular importance when considering cases where some agents have in nocently benefited, or are benefiting from injustice, and where those that contributed to the injustice itself are either unwilling or unable to rectify it. Examples of this sort include differential burdens and benefits arising from human-induced climate change, historic injustices (such as colonialism), and unjust arrangements of international trade and economic cooperation.