EUI - The Empirical Effects of Procedural Justice Reforms in International Institutions

How decisions are reached is central to the functioning of international cooperative institutions. This project examines what happens when decision-making procedures in such institutions are reformed. The shortcomings of international institutions have for long been subjects of debate. As many of the most influential international institutions were conceived decades ago, often in the image of a handful of powerful states, critics have blamed such institutions for being outdated and unmodern. A prominent strand of critique argues that many such institutions are incapable of responding adequately to current needs because they suffer from legitimacy deficits in their decision-making procedures. To rectify this problem, procedural justice reforms are often proposed as a remedy. Procedural justice reforms are systematic efforts to rectify legitimacy deficits that have arisen because the institution?s decision-making procedures are perceived as unjust by one or several participating member states. The procedural justice literature suggests that decision-making procedures that follow certain precepts of fairness are more likely to generate legitimacy, succeed in reaching compromise, solve relevant issues, and result in decisions that are accepted and implemented. This project is interested in the legitimation effects of procedural justice reforms and examines whether such reforms succeed in improving the perceived legitimacy of international institutions among states. It asks: What are the legitimation effects of implementing procedural justice reforms in international institutions? Three procedural justice reforms are analysed to shed light on the research questions: 1) A participation reform in the climate negotiations under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 2) an impartiality reform in the dispute settlement system at the World Trade Organisation and 3) a transparency reform at the United Nations Security Council. By studying the effects of these three different procedural justice reforms comparatively, this study will potentially reveal theoretically and empirically valuable information about how decision-making procedures can generate and hamper widespread perceptions of legitimacy among member states within such institutions. This is theoretically valuable, because both the importance of decision-making procedures, the effects of organisational reform, and the production of legitimacy among states are under-researched topics in the international relations literature on multilateral cooperation; and empirically valuable, because this is an effort to pinpoint strengths and flaws in the design of such institutions, and therefore contribute potentially valuable concrete advice for how international institutions most successfully can respond to legitimacy deficits by enhancing their working methods and decision-making procedures.

Prosjektet er ikke ferdig, og resultatene ikke klare. Det er fortsatt ca 1,5 år igjen av mitt doktorgradsprosjekt.

Many international institutions are struggling in providing the conditions for facilitating global cooperation between states, as they are meant to. Such struggles have been observed in virtually all issue domains of global governance, from cooperation on security and trade to joint efforts aimed at saving the environment Consequently, the shortcomings of these institutions have for long been subjects of debate in the international relations literature. As many of the most influential international institutions were conceived decades ago, often in the image of a handful of powerful states, critics have blamed such institutions for being outdated. A prominent strand of such critique argues that international institutions are incapable of responding adequately to current needs because they suffer from a ‘democratic deficit’ in their decision-making procedures (Patomäki & Teivainen 2004; Zürn 2004). To rectify this problem, what is here termed ‘procedural justice reform’ is often proposed as a remedy. Procedural justice reforms are systematic efforts to rectify legitimacy deficits that have arisen because the institution’s decision-making procedures are perceived as unrightful or unjust by one or several participating member states. The ‘democratic deficit’ and procedural justice literatures suggest that decisions that are reached through decision-making procedures largely perceived as ‘just’ by participating states are more likely to be accepted and implemented than decisions that are not. However, by the standard account, power considerations (Martin 1992; Mearsheimer 1994) and transaction costs (Keohane 1989; Koremenos et al. 2001) are two important explanations for how international institutions are designed and function. The relationship between procedural justice in decision-making on one hand, and power politics and effectiveness concerns on the other, is therefore contentious. If procedural justice demands come into conflict with either of these two concerns, dilemmas that have no clear solution can emerge, since international institutions often depend on the support of the greatest powers and the forging of effective outcomes for their continued relevance. It is striking, therefore, that despite strong demands for procedural justice reforms of international institutions in the literature, little is known about the actual content and effects of such reforms. This dissertation attempts to fill this lacuna. It sets out to assess two questions that relate to the discussion above, namely 1) How do states attempt to reform decision-making procedures in international institutions? And 2) What are the empirical effects of implementing procedural justice reforms? Three international institutions that have undergone various types of procedural justice reforms in recent years are analysed to shed light on the research questions: 1) the negotiations under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), 2) the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and 3) the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). By studying the content and effects of procedural justice reforms in these three institutions comparatively, this study will potentially reveal theoretically and empirically valuable information about how decision-making procedures can generate and hamper widespread perceptions of legitimacy among member states within such institutions. This is theoretically valuable, because both the importance of decision-making procedures, the effects of organisational reform, and the production of legitimacy among states are under-researched topics in the international relations literature on multilateral cooperation; and empirically valuable, because this is an effort to pinpoint strengths and flaws in the design of such institutions, and therefore contribute potentially valuable concrete advice for how international institutions most successfully can respond to legitimacy deficits by enhancing their working methods and decision-making procedures.