Strategies of symbolic nation-building in West Balkan states: intents and results

Symbolic nation-building. Major findings -general and comparative Findings on the actual nation-building strategies employed: In our project we found that the nation-building model pursued in the various West Balkan countries were often very diffe rent from each other. In some states, the nation is defined very much in ethnic terms; the titular 'narod' ('people' or 'ethno-nation') is regarded as the 'state-building nation' or the 'core' of the state-nation. This is primarily the case in states wher e one ethno-nation comprises a hefty majority (Serbia, Croatia, Albania). This nation-building strategy is reflected in the choice of national symbols, rituals, national holidays, and so on. Also Macedonia initially defined the nation in ethnic terms but was forced to switch to a more inclusive nation-building strategy after the Albanian insurrection in 2001 and the subsequent conclusion of the Ohrid Accords. Montenegro-another post-Yugoslav state with a numerically weak titular ethno-nation- has all along opted for an inclusive nation-building strategy with both civic and multicultural elements. Bosnia and Kosovo represent a third group, since neither state has been able to choose its nation-building strategy, instead, the adopted nation-state mo del has been imposed by the international community. In Bosnia, a state with no ethnic majority population, this has led to an ethnically defined federation with weak central powers and few effective overarching national symbols. Kosovo, by contrast, is a state with one numerically predominant nation, the Albanians, but also this state has been grudgingly forced to accept a non-ethnic nation-state model, which contains some non-ethnic and some multinational symbols. Findings on the reception among t he population of the nation-building strategies employed. Our large scale opinion poll (10,500 respondents) showed that support for the nation-state in the seven surveyed countries varied significantly, The clear looser was Bosnia-Hercegovina: on a loy alty index that ran from +14 to -14 the BiH population scored just above zero (0.56). The main reason behind this dismal result is clearly that the political leadership in Republika Srpska, one of the two entities that make up the state, is actively under mining the attempts of nation-state consolidation at the federal level. While the poor result in BiH should not come as no surprise we were less prepared to see that Kosovo ended up as the state with the highest loyalty score of all. We had assumed th at states which can provide their citizens with basic security and welfare should have the highest degree of support among its citizens. Kosovo, however, has the lowest GDP per capita, the lowest life expectancy, the highest unemployment ate, and scores l owest on the Human Development Index of all the surveyed countries. Clearly, the hypothesis that successful nation-building hinges on successful state-building does not hold. Running a regression analysis of background factors that may influence loyal ty attitudes in the various states' age, gender, type of settlement, ethnicity and total household income -we found that ethnicity was by far the strongest indicator of successful nation-building. This means that a state with an ethnically homogenous popu lation has a stronger chance of securing a high degree of loyalty among its citizens than a multiethnic state. This is basically true irrespective of the chosen nation-state model: Multinational Montenegro, for instance got the second lowest loyalty score even if this country has opted for an inclusive and non-ethnic nation-building strategy.

?Nation-building? as defined in this project consists of two elements. 1. Deliberate homogenization of the population?s political-cultural identity; and 2. Policies to link this identity to the state. The project concentrates on symbolic nation-building, meaning state strategies for the manufacture and manipulation of cultural symbols intended to create a sense of nationhood in a population. We want to see if these strategies resonate in the population. We single out four parameters of identity controvers ies: religious culture, ethnic culture, historical imagination, and geographical imagination. To determine the success and failure of the nation-building strategies we measure the correspondence between the idea of nationhood that is propounded by the s tate leaders and the collective self-understanding of the population. As a method to operationalise this criterion we will use Albert Hirschman?s trichotomy of "exit, voice and loyalty" as a template. We will commission large-N opinion surveys in all West Balkan countries ? 1500 respondents in each state -- to establish to what degree various groups in the population support the nation idea propounded by the state leaders. Finally, we will ask about the preconditions for a high/low degree of corresponden ce between a certain nation-building program and societal attitudes. Data on these background factors will be taken from various population statistics and aggregated indices compiled by other researchers, and our survey data will be measured against them. Regression analysis may tell us whether they have a significant impact or not. Among such background factors we will concentrate on the following: state capacity; ethnic, religious, linguistic, and economic heterogeneity in the population; past history of violence, and level of democracy. The ramifications of nation-building strategies for the stability and democratic development in emerging but volatile states are obvious.