The nature, design and feasibility of robust climate agreements

This project aims to contribute internationally to the knowledge and understanding of the current climate regime, the climate negotiations, international environmental agreements more generally, and those aspects having to do with compliance, enforcement, participation, and regime design in particular. We will analyse in detail how the conditions for a robust future climate agreement can be satisfied. The project consists of six work packages (WPs), all of which consider the topic of robustness. WP 1 st udies to what extent trade sanctions - a typical 'stick' policy - can induce broad participation and deter non-compliance in a future climate treaty. In contrast, WP 2 considers participation from a 'carrot' perspective by analyzing whether deep unilatera l emission cuts by developed countries can induce later, deep emission cuts in developing countries through technological advances. WP 3 also focuses on possibilities for broadening participation, but looks at other options for inducing more countries to take on binding emission reduction commitments. WP 4 and WP 5 look deeper into the problem of enforcement and participation by applying the theory of dynamic games, while WP 6 will consider the political feasibility of potent enforcement systems.