Assessing the Impact of Local Political Institutions on Voter Turnout

Institutions matter for a wide range of human decisions. With respect to voters turnout decisions, both the institutional design of the election (e.g., compulsory voting, electoral system, postal or Sunday voting) as well as that of the jurisdiction (e.g. , population size, preference distribution reflected in election closeness) have been shown to play a central role (for an overview, see Geys, 2006). Somewhat surprisingly, however, the institutional design of public good provision has thereby been neglec ted in both the economic and political literature. Still, revenue and expenditure autonomy of local government units varies both across and within countries, which is likely to affect individuals perceived net benefit of voting. Moreover, substantial inst itutional reforms, such as municipal amalgamations or separations, have occurred throughout Europe during the past decades, which is unlikely to leave voters? cost-benefit calculation with respect to their turnout decision unaffected. In this project, we analyse the presence of institutional effects on voter turnout that go beyond the effects of institutional design of the election and the jurisdiction (often constrained to a population-size related argumentation; see above), and thus provide a stepping stone to a more comprehensive understanding of institutions in the context of political participation. To this end, we expand the standard rational voter theory by explicitly introducing the local institutional arrangements regarding public good provision . We thereby allow for institutional features to affect individuals? perceived probability of being "pivotal" (i.e., influencing the political outcome), which will affect their perceived net benefit of voting. Empirically, we take advantage of the variati on in institutional settings at the local level in Germany to identify the impact of diverse institutional arrangements on voter turnout.